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COMPENSATION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
TORTS: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF FAULT 
John C. Jeffries, Jr. * 
This essay is about a neglected aspect of the problem of redressing 
constitutional violations. Most discussions focus on incentive effects. 
Unconstitutional conduct can be discouraged by the "hands-on" 
mechanism of reform by injunction or, more commonly, through the 
indirection of deterrence. Deterrence issues include selection of the 
penalties needed to deter official misconduct; the risk that they may 
also inhibit legitimate government activity; the recruitment of private 
attorneys general to augment enforcement; and various costs of ad-
ministration. These and other aspects of deterrence pervade discus-
sions in the Supreme Court. They are also debated in a rich and 
sophisticated secondary literature. I But there is another side to the 
matter that has received scant attention. That issue is the role of com-
pensation for violations of constitutional rights as a value independent 
of any incentive effect. 
"Compensation" for violations of constitutional rights has been 
identified by the Supreme Court as an important goal. The term is not 
self-explanatory, but it suggests some nondeterrent value in the award 
of money damages. Even though its decisions have sharply limited the 
award of damages for constitutional violations, the Court continues to 
invoke the goal of compensation, and commentators propose reforms 
to make compensatory damages more available. 
Both the Court and the commentators assume that compensation 
for violations of constitutional rights is, self-evidently, a good idea. 
They assume the existence of a theory of compensation - subject, of 
course, to competing concerns, but presumptively applicable to all in-
juries caused by all violations of constitutional rights. This theory is 
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not explained, but the assumption seems to be that compensating vic-
tims is a sensible, and perhaps a sufficient, rationale for awarding 
damages for violations of constitutional rights. 
The purpose of this essay is to examine that assumption. In my 
view, the goal of compensation for denials of constitutional rights is 
more problematic than has been supposed. Specifically, I suggest that 
there is no persuasive theory indifferently comprehending compensa-
tion for all injuries caused by all violations of constitutional rights. 
The assumption of compensation as a universal desideratum of the law 
governing official misconduct seems to me misguided. 
Lest this argument be misunderstood, let me emphasize at the out-
set the limits of my claim. I am not making an undifferentiated broad-
side attack on the use of money damages to vindicate constitutional 
rights. Damage awards are appropriate, indeed essential, to remedy 
some constitutional violations. Traditionally, discussion of the dam-
ages remedy focuses on incentive effects. I agree that noninstrumental 
concerns should intrude on that debate, but not in the broad and un-
differentiated way suggested by loose use of the term "compensation." 
Later in this essay, I sketch an alternative, noninstrumental rationale 
for awarding money damages for some constitutional violations. As 
the title implies, this alternative rationale is much concerned with the 
role of fault in constitutional violations. 
I. COMPENSATION UNDER EXISTING LAW 
The chief vehicles for compensating victims of government uncon-
stitutionality are 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the parallel common-law 
action based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics. 2 Section 1983 authorizes an action for damages 
(or other relief) against any "person" who, acting "under color of" 
state law, denies any federal right.3 Bivens created an analogous cause 
of action against federal officials. 4 
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
3. The full text provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
4. Bivens itself created a damages action for fourth amendment violations. The opinion, 
ho~ever, did not speak narrowly to that context, and subsequent cases have taken Bivens to 
mean that a damages remedy is generally available, absent "special factors counselling hesita-
tion." 403 U.S. at 396. 
84 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:82 
For both actions, compensation is said to be an important goal. 
The Court has identified compensation as a "fundamental purpose" of 
section 1983,5 and has said that "the basic purpose of a § 1983 dam-
ages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the 
deprivation of constitutional rights. "6 Similar remarks occur in many 
Court opinions7 and in the comments of individual Justices. 8 And 
compensation is also seen as an important objective of the analogous 
cause of action against federal officials. 9 
Despite such statements, the precedents sharply curtail the 
availability of money damages. First, there is the eleventh amend-
ment.10 The Court has construed this provision to inhibit recovery of 
damages from states or state agencies. 11 "Inhibit" is used advisedly, 
for despite the supposedly constitutional nature of the bar, damage 
actions against states are permitted when Congress clearly says so. 12 
5. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (stating that denial ofcompcnsa· 
tion would "be contrary to the fundamental purpose of§ 1983"). 
6. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). The Court, per Justice Powell, endorsed this 
view by way of approving an argument against award of more than nominal damages in the 
absence of proof of injury. The full statement reads: "Insofar as petitioners contend that the 
basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by 
the deprivation of constitutional rights, they have the better of the argument." See also Memphis 
Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (reiterating that nonpunitive awards 
must be designed to compensate for actual injuries, not simply to vindicate the abstract "impor· 
tance" of a constitutional right). 
7. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2308 (1988) (stating that "the central purpose of 
the Reconstruction-Era laws is to provide compensatory relief to those deprived of their federal 
rights by state actors"); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1981) 
(disallowing § 1983 awards of punitive damages against municipalities on the ground that "it 
never has been suggested that punishment is as prominent a purpose under the statute as are 
compensation and deterrence"); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980) (identi· 
fying compensation and deterrence as "two of the principle policies embodied in§ 1983"); Owen 
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-54 (1980) (emphasizing the importance under § 1983 
of "the societal interest in compensating the innocent victims of governmental misconduct"). 
8. See, e.g., Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 313 (1986) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in the judgment) (identifying compensation as "the basic purpose of a § 1983 
damage award") (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978)); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 
471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing compensation of victims as a reason for 
imposing respondeat superior liability on municipalities); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (specifying compensation and deterrence as the purposes of§ 1983); 
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 599 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (specifying compen· 
sation and deterrence as the "critical concerns" of § 1983). 
9. Bivens emphasized the traditional availability of compensatory damages for personal in· 
jury. 403 U.S. at 395-97; see also 403 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978). 
10. The amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con· 
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. 
CONST. amend:XI. 
11. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
12. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 
U.S. 445 (1976). 
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Section 1983 could have been read as such a clear statement, 13 but the 
Court has refused to do so.14 The result is that damages actions for 
constitutional violations will not lie against states or against state of-
ficers sued in an official capacity. The only recourse is to sue a state 
officer for individual misconduct. 
It is true, of course, that states routinely indemnify their employees 
against such liability, but the identity of the defendant may well mat-
ter. The requirement that suit be brought against an individual official 
means that plaintiffs cannot sue a "deep pocket." Juries may be more 
sympathetic to the plight of individual officials than to the govern-
ments they represent. 15 And the bar against suing governments di-
rectly may make it especially difficult to pursue claims of institutional 
malfunction or collapse. The focus on individual responsibility tends 
to divert attention from problems of government structure and organi-
zation, as distinct from the specific acts of individual officials.16 
More important, all government officials (whether state or fed-
eral)17 can claim some sort of immunity against an award of damages. 
Sometimes the immunity is absolute, and the sacrifice of competing 
interests is correspondingly complete.18 More commonly, officials can 
invoke a qualified immunity defense. Originally framed in the context 
of false arrest, the qualified immunity was said to arise if the defendant 
police officers could show "good faith and probable cause" for their 
actions. 19 As extended to other contexts, the formulations of qualified 
13. The case for doing so was first made by Justice Brennan in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 
332, 354-65 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
14. WiJJ v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989); Quern, 440 U.S. at 338-45; 
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 676-77. 
15. This potential is illustrated in cases involving municipal liability. In that context, plain-
tiffs ordinarily sue both individual officials and the governments that employ them. The results 
are sometimes very disparate. See, for example, Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), 
where a jury returned a verdict in favor of a rookie police officer who had shot and killed a man 
quite unnecessarily, but assessed damages against the municipality in the amount of $1.5 million. 
16. For an argument to this effect, see Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitu-
tional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 259 (1986). 
17. The immunities available to state and federal officials are generally the same. See Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (concluding that it would be "untenable to draw a distinc-
tion for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and 
suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials"). The major exception is 
the President, who enjoys an absolute damages immunity that has no parallel among state execu-
tive officers. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
18. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (absolute immunity for 
prosecutorial conduct "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process"); 
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (absolute immunity for judicial acts); Tenney v. Brandhove, 
341 U.S. 367 (1951) (absolute immunity for legislative acts). 
19. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557. 
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immunity became progressively more variegated and abstract,20 but 
retained until lately the conjunction of subjective and objective ele-
ments. Recently, however, the Court has become concerned that the 
issue of a defendant's subjective "good faith" invites unnecessarily 
wide-ranging discovery and frustrates the appropriate use of summary 
judgment. The Court's response has been to de-emphasize the subjec-
tive branch of the inquiry and to focus instead on the objective reason-
ableness of the defendant's conduct.21 Under the latest precedents, it 
seems likely that summary judgment will be granted, in advance of 
discovery, where the defendant can show that a reasonable official in 
his or her situation could have believed the conduct lawful.22 In any 
event, it is plain that the defense of qualified immunity precludes com-
pensation for many unconstitutional acts. Only in extreme or flagrant 
cases will damages likely be paid. 
In one context only is compensation the controlling value. Despite 
its usual willingness to subordinate compensation to other concerns, 
the Supreme Court has moved aggressively to compensate persons in-
jured by an official "policy or custom" of local government. Monell v. 
Department of Social Services 23 held that a city, unlike a state, is a 
"person" within the meaning of section 1983.24 Owen v. City of Inde-
20. The most comprehensive statement of qualified immunity comes from Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974): 
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of 
government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities 
of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the 
belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, 
that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the 
course of official conduct. 
21. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
22. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). At least this is true where the plaintiff 
makes only a broad and unsubstantiated allegation of bad faith. Whether the same rule would 
apply where the plaintiff is able to present'plausible and concrete allegations of bad faith is open 
to question. My own guess is that the Supreme Court does not desire to eliminate altogether the 
subjective branch of the qualified immunity inquiry, but only to discipline the process of discov-
ery. Where the claimant makes concrete and detailed allegations fairly suggestive of official bad 
faith, I would expect those allegations to be heard. 
23. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
24. Nothing will be said here about the "reasoning" of Monell, as the opinion is concerned 
chiefly with the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Anyone who spends time with 
the Court's investigations of that history will find them at least opportunistic. Monell is a partic-
ularly rich example. First, it reversed the Court's earlier and unanimous conclusion, based 
equally on the history of the 1871 Act, that "person" did not include municipality. See Monroe 
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961). Second, the Monell Court found in that same history a 
requirement, for municipal liability, of an official "policy or custom" supporting the unconstitu-
tional act. This is the same sort of showing that the Monroe Court, over Justice Frankfurter's 
dissent, refused to require for any other "person" who might be sued under§ 1983. Thus, we are 
told that the 42d Congress simultaneously intended to require proof of an official policy or cus-
tom in order to hold a municipality liable as a "person" acting "under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage" of state law (R.S. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983), but to 
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pendence 25 added that a city, unlike every other "person," potentially 
liable under the statute, has no immunity against the award of dam-
ages. As Justice Powell complained in dissent, "municipalities . . . 
have gone in two short years from absolute immunity under§ 1983 to 
strict liability."26 Of course, this rule is restricted by the requirement 
of an official "policy or custom," a requirement that seems to tum on 
whether the offending action was taken by someone with authority to 
make official policy with respect to that issue. 27 Where that showing 
can be made, injured persons can recover money damages without re-
gard to the reasonableness of the government's conduct or the plausi-
bility of a belief in its legality. 
The remarkable thing about Owen is its discontinuity with other 
cases. The early immunity decisions paid little attention to policy con-
cerns one way or the other; they were preoccupied with the inferences 
that might be drawn from the Oack of) discussion of the immunity 
issue in 1871.28 More recently, the Court has referred to "two mutu-
ally dependent rationales" for official immunity: 
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to 
liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, 
to exercise discretion; [and] (2) the danger that the threat of such liabil-
ity would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness 
dispense with this requirement for any other kind of "person" sued under the same provision. As 
a matter of policy, these positions may not be inevitµ.bly incompatible, but they are not a persua-
sive reading of the historical record adduced in the Court's opinions. For a similar complaint 
regarding the Court's historical treatment of immunity issues, see Matasar, Personal Immunities 
under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741 (1987). 
25. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
26. 445 U.S. at 665 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
27. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (holding that municipal 
liability may be imposed for a single decision by a municipal official, but only where that official 
has "final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered"); Oklahoma 
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (holding that a municipal "policy" of inadequate training 
cannot be inferred from a single instance of police misconduct). For academic investigation of 
where to draw the line, see Brown, Municipal Liability under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of 
Burger Court Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City 
of Cincinnati - the "Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C. L. REV. 883 (1986); Gerhardt, The Monell 
Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 539 (1989); and Snyder, The Final Authority Analysis: A Unified Approach to 
Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 633. The necessity of making the 
distinction is attacked in Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Be-
comes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517 (1987), which urges that municipalities be held 
liable for the acts of employees on a theory of respondeat superior, and in Kramer & Sykes, 
Municipal Liability Under§ 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. Cr. REV. 249, 
which concludes that either a comprehensive negligence requirement or conventional respondeat 
superior would be preferable to the requirement of official "policy or custom." 
28. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (examining official immunity at com-
mon law and finding in legislative silence "no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish 
wholesale all common-law immunities"). 
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and judgment required by the public good. 29 
Obviously, these concerns were invoked to limit the award of dam-
ages. In Owen, however, the Court (in addition to the usual historical 
exertions) discovered the importance of compensation: 
A damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of 
any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees .... Yet 
owing to the qualified immunity enjoyed by most government officials, 
see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), many victims of municipal 
malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed to as-
sert a good-faith defense. 3o 
This is true. Many persons injured by municipal unconstitutionality 
would be left remediless if cities were allowed a good-faith defense. 
And that is precisely the situation in which most persons harmed by 
state or federal unconstitutionality currently find themselves. 
Grounds for distinguishing among these cases were nowhere 
specified. 31 
Owen is also notable for its selective reliance on modern tort prin-
ciples. The Court noted that many victims of municipal unconstitu-
tionality would be left remediless if cities were allowed to claim 
29. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 
U.S. 622, 654 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978). 
30. 445 U.S. at 651. 
31. The suggestion has been made that the disparity is explained by the eleventh amendment. 
That provision casts whatever protection it may be thought to provide over states and state 
agencies, but not over units of local government. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 
(1890). Thus, for those who accept the broad outlines of current eleventh amendment doctrine, 
it is plausible to assert that the different treatment accorded victims of state and municipal con-
stitutional violations, although unintelligible as a matter of policy, follows from history and pre-
cedent. 
The trouble is that this explanation isolates one small fragment of eleventh amendment prece-
dent. Elsewhere the cases afford ample opportunity for reconciling state and municipal liability. 
This could be done simply by reading the word "person" in § 1983 to exclude cities as well as 
states or to include states as well as cities. Either interpretation fits the statutory language tolera-
bly well, and neither does more violence to history than readers of Supreme Court opinions have 
come to expect. Cf. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). 
Alternatively, the Court could retain the current bifurcated reading of "person" and simply 
withdraw from all such "persons" the defense of qualified immunity. As a practical matter, 
governments at all levels find it necessary to indemnify their employees against liability incurred 
in the course of employment. In many jurisdictions, this is required by statute. See, e.g., CAL. 
GOVT. CODE§ 825 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp. 1989); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-301 (Smith-Hurd 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1408 
(West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 59:10-4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW§ 18 
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1989). In other jurisdictions, the same result is accomplished without 
statutory command. See generally Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 
(1979). If government officials were denied the immunity defense, the practical effect would be to 
hold their employing governments to the same standard of liability. And if, as has been true in 
the past, the liability offederal officers sued under Bivens were aligned with the law of§ 1983, the 
result would be a comprehensive regime of no immunity for government at all levels. 
Whether this would be sound policy is not the issue here. My point is only that a consistent 
policy one way or the other is well within the demonstrated range of judicial creativity. The 
Court is not disabled from making sense. 
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qualified immunity, then added: "Unless countervailing considera-
tions counsel otherwise, the injustice of such a result should not be 
tolerated."32 Evidently, noncompensation is unjust whenever loss is 
caused by unconstitutional conduct, without regard to the kind of 
fault identified by the law of qualified immunity.33 In other words, the 
argument assumes that "justice" requires the award of money dam-
ages whenever unconstitutional conduct causes injury to another. As 
the Court phrased it: "Elemental notions of fairness dictate that one 
who causes a loss should bear the loss."34 
Now, this conception is familiar to tort scholars in proposals of no-
fault liability,35 and perhaps it is nearly descriptive of pockets of 
American tort law. But as a general proposition, the claim that com-
pensation should inevitably follow causation - the notion that all un-
compensated loss is unjust - is anything but "elemental." And it is 
certainly not descriptive of any familiar principle of governmental tort 
liability. One need only say the words "just compensation" to be re-
minded of the extent to which mere loss- causing has been found inad-
equate to require government compensation. Thus, Owen not only 
makes a sharp break with earlier section 1983 cases, it also adopts for 
violations of constitutional rights an unusual conception of the appro-
priate basis for tort liability generally. 
Of course, to say that a position is new and controversial is not to 
prove it wrong. In· fact, the innovation in Owen has important aca-
demic support.36 In my view, however, Owen is wrong, and not for 
any trivial reason. The essential problem is the unsound assumption 
that compensation for all losses caused by all violations of constitu-
tional rights is a sensible goal of section 1983. I am not arguing 
merely that the goal of compensation may be outweighed by compet-
ing concerns. Everyone agrees with that. My claim is more ambitious 
and surely more controversial. It is that compensation for losses 
32. 445 U.S. at 651. 
33. This awkward phrasing is required because, for some rights, fault of a kind may be neces-
sary to make out a constitutional violation. More will be said later about the particular concept 
of fault that underlies the defense of qualified immunity and that the Owen Court found unneces-
sary in the case of municipal liability. 
34. 445 U.S. at 654. 
35. See, e.g., Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 677 (1985). 
36. See, e.g., P. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 101; Mead, supra note 27 (arguing for municipal 
liability without fault and without regard to the "policy or custom" limitation of Monell); cf. 
Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (1977) 
(impliedly endorsing this position by arguing for governmental liability in situations where indi-
vidual officers would not be liable). 
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caused by constitutional violations is not a uniformly sensible aspira-
tion. The next section of this essay examines why that might be so. 
II. RATIONALES FOR COMPENSATION 
Why - apart from incentive effects - should violations of consti-
tutional rights be compensable in money damages? What kinds of rea-
sons, other than deterrence, might be advanced to support such 
payments? 
A. Affirmation of Rights 
Perhaps the most obvious reason is simple affirmation of rights. A 
right without a remedy is, if not meaningless, at least incomplete. But 
the desirability of some remedy does not prove the desirability of any 
particular remedy. Possible remedies include criminal prosecution, 
declaratory or injunctive relief, administrative discipline, and civil 
fines, as well as compensatory damages. The argument for affirmation 
of rights does not speak to the choice among them. 
B. Distributive Justice 
Less readily dismissed is the idea that compensation for violations 
of constitutional rights is somehow justified by a concern for distribu-
tive justice. 37 The origins of this intuition are understandable. Denial 
of a constitutional right ordinarily causes injury. The victim is worse 
off than before, perhaps greatly so. If the government is viewed, as it 
tends to be, as the ultimate "deep pocket," a wealth transfer to the 
injured person may seem distributively sound. The plausibility of this 
assumption is likely enhanced by the historic (but increasingly attenu-
ated) association of section 1983 with the protection of society's least 
fortunate. 
Of course, none of this survives reflection. Simply put, there is no 
reason to suppose that persons harmed by. unconstitutional acts are 
especially deserving beneficiaries of redistribution of wealth. To be 
sure, any injured person presents a sympathetic case for wealth trans-
fer. An injured individual has suffered loss, and losses ideally should 
be prevented or offset. In the real world, however, even devastating 
losses routinely go unredressed. The loss of a job, injury to one's sight, 
infection with AIDS - these are not in themselves compensable 
events. Nor do they necessarily lead to anything more than minimally 
37. Note that this discussion deals only with strictly distributive concerns. To some, the 
phrase "distributivejustice" may evoke the idea of"correctivejustice," which is considered scpa· 
rately below. 
October 1989] Constitutional Torts 91 
adequate public welfare. To a significant degree, those losses lie where 
they fall. But, one might say, surely there is a difference between 
losses caused by human agency and so-called "acts of God." Indeed 
there is, but the difference lies precisely in the relevance of nondis-
tributive rationales for awarding damages. Insofar as the focus is on 
distributive justice, it is hard to see why the person harmed by uncon-
stitutional conduct should move to the head of the line. 
The same is true if one considers only those losses caused by gov-
ernment. Governments cause many harms. Some result from uncon-
stitutional conduct; others from lawful action. From a distributive 
point of view, the difference is immaterial. Neither the severity of the 
injury nor the degree of resulting hardship depends on the legality of 
the government's act. Lawful government action may cause devastat-
ing harm, while even flagrant unconstitutionality may injure only 
slightly. If money is collected from all members of society to compen-
sate those injured by unconstitutional government acts, some persons 
gravely harmed by (lawful) government action will be made to join in 
compensating minor (unlawful) injuries to economically advantaged 
individuals. As a scheme for redistributing wealth, or merely for re-
lieving hardship, this makes little sense. 
An example will show how indistinguishable lawful and unlawful 
injury may be. Consider a case of search and seizure. The police 
come to a home. They wake the occupants, herd them outside, and 
hold them there while their house and its contents are exhaustively 
searched. At the least, this sort of intrusion is an inconvenience. At 
the most, it may cause anxiety and distress, public embarrassment and 
humiliation, loss of standing in the community, even physical damage. 
None of these harms depends on the lawfulness of the search. Neither 
do they flow from the victim's own wrongdoing.38 Viewed simply as 
an occasion for shifting wealth to offset loss, the severity of injury and 
degree of resulting hardship should control. The legality of the gov-
ernment's conduct is merely incidental. 
Because unconstitutional acts are thought of as especially bad, the 
impression sometimes persists that unconstitutionality is a reliable 
proxy for severity of harm. It is important to recognize that this is not 
true. Consider the case of a person wrongly (that is, inaccurately) 
convicted of crime. The person is sentenced to prison and is confined 
several years before exculpatory evidence comes to light. Predictable 
38. The legality of the search is not dependably related to misconduct by the victim. Even 
where the person harmed by the intrusion and the target of the search are the same, the rela-
tionship is only probabilistic. Moreover, some persons not even suspected of wrongdoing will be 
injured as well. 
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harms include loss of economic and social standing, disruption of fam-
ily relationships, and the risks and degradations of confinement. In 
causing these harms, the government and all of its agents may have 
behaved entirely properly. There may have been no misconduct, 
much less illegality, on anyone's part. Yet an innocent individual has 
suffered, and suffered grievously, at the hands of the government. 
There can be no more poignant case for financial restitution from soci-
ety at large, yet no unconstitutionality has occurred. 
I conclude, therefore, that compensation for constitutional viola-
tions cannot be justified on grounds of distributive justice. The benefi-
ciaries of such a program would not be dependably worse off than 
their fellow citizens; neither would they necessarily have suffered 
greater harm. As a class, they would not be more deserving of aid 
than other members of society. One might think that the charitable 
impulse would more sensibly be aimed at all who suffer special hard-
ship, without regard to cause or origin. But whatever the right criteria 
for redistributing wealth, the mere fact that injury is caused by govern-
ment unconstitutionality is not, in itself, a suitable test. 
C. Loss Spreading 
Another possible reason for compensation is loss spreading. The 
term is sometimes used to evoke distributive concerns. Apart from 
that, "loss spreading" suggests an argument based on the diminishing 
marginal utility of money.39 If the diminishing marginal utility of 
money were comparable across individuals, then spreading a given loss 
over many persons would diminish its total impact. In Benthamite 
terminology, the assumption is that 10,000 persons who lose one dol-
lar each will feel in the aggregate less pain than one person who loses 
$10,000. Of course, the accuracy of this assumption can be debated, 40 
but the objections to loss spreading as a reason to compensate for con-
stitutional violations go beyond the general problem of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. Even if one accepts the general validity of such 
comparisons, important difficulties remain. 
For one thing, loss spreading as a rationale for compensation is 
most plausible where transaction costs are small. Where they are 
large, the total loss to be distributed will be significantly increased by 
the costs of administration. The additional loss will swamp any de-
crease in aggregate pain achieved by spreading. This objection is espe-
39. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-41 (1970). 
40. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 
417 (1952). 
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cially telling in the present context. The costs of adjudicating damages 
claims under section 1983 and the analogous Bivens-type remedies are 
anything but minimal, and it is hard to believe that they can be offset 
by utility gains from loss spreading. 
More fundamentally, loss spreading raises questions similar to 
those considered in connection with distributive justice. Why spread 
only losses caused by constitutional violations? Why not spread all 
losses, or at least all losses caused by government? Even if one accepts 
the (admittedly unprovable) premise that loss spreading decreases to-
tal pain, and even if one discounts the (probably decisive) impact of 
transaction costs, it is still not clear how loss spreading justifies com-
pensation for some losses but not others. Simply put, there is no obvi-
ous link between the general rationale of loss spreading and the 
specific issue of compensation for injuries resulting from constitutional 
violations. Whatever force loss spreading may be thought to have (or 
lack) as a general matter, that rationale does not target losses caused 
by unconstitutional government conduct for a special regime. Com-
pensation as a goal of the specific regime of section 1983 and Bivens-
type actions is not explained on this ground. 
D. Corrective Justice 
To my mind, the most persuasive nondeterrence justification for 
awarding tort damages to victims of government unconstitutionality 
lies in the idea of "corrective justice." The concept comes from Aris-
totle,41 who saw in the relationship of wrongdoer to victim a basis for 
awarding damages without regard to relative wealth or virtue. "Cor-
rective justice" has reappeared in the debates of modern tort theorists, 
not always to the same effect.42 The version sketched l_iere is adapted 
from Ernest J. Weinrib, whose article Causation and Wrongdoing is 
the basis for much of the following.43 
"Corrective justice" is a noninstrumental conception of tort liabil-
ity. In this view, tort law does not simply work out the interplay 
among various external functions that damages might be thought to 
41. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS *1130a-*1132b. 
42. See, e.g., Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982); 
Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 
(1979); Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, IO J. LEGAL 
STUD. 187 (1981 ). 
43. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987). Weinrib's arti-
cle addresses tort theory generally. As is likely all too clear, I am not a tort scholar, and I do not 
feel competent to express an opinion on the general success of his position. In the specific (and 
special) context of government torts, Weinrib's reasoning seems to me informative. These re-
marks address only that context. 
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serve. 44 Rather, it expresses a single normative conception integrating 
defendant's wrongdoing and plaintiff's injury. The premise is Kant-
ian. Persons are ends in themselves; they cannot be expropriated for 
another's purpose. Therefore, relations among persons are subject to 
the concept of right. "Right" refers to "the totality of conditions 
under which the actions of one can be united with the freedom of 
others in accordance with a universal law."45 Interaction among free 
and equal moral persons must observe these conditions. 
The analogy to constitutionalism is apparent. Persons must be 
treated as ends in themselves, not merely as objects or instruments of 
government policy. They cannot simply be used for the common 
good. Therefore, relations between the government and individuals 
are subject to the concept of right. The rights recognized under the 
Constitution state conditions under which the actions of the govern-
ment can be united with the freedom of the individual. Respecting the 
rights of individuals requires limitations on the use of government 
power, and these are captured in the familiar prohibitions of constitu-
tional law. 
In this conception, government wrongdoing that causes individual 
injury should be redressed by the award of damages, without regard to 
the antecedent (or resulting) distribution of wealth. The government 
has achieved a wrongful gain (some more effective or less costly imple-
mentation of government policy) by inflicting a wrongful loss. The 
award of damages from government to victim at once annuls the 
wrongful gain and rectifies the wrongful loss. The payment from 
wrongdoer to victim retraces the moral relationship between them. To 
the extent possible, it undoes the wrong. The point is not merely that 
the loss is offset (as a loss in one stock might be offset by a gain in 
another), but that the loss is rectified by damages from the wrongdoer. 
And government funding is required, not simply because a loss oc-
curred (as might be implied by a concern for distributive justice), but 
because it was caused by government wrongdoing. This restorative 
transfer from wrongdoer to victim is intelligible as corrective justice, 
without regard to distributive effect. 
Both causation and wrongdoing are essential to this conception. 
Causation links victim to wrongdoer. It particularizes the relation be-
tween them by showing why this plaintiff is entitled to recover.46 De-
44. Cf Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975). 
45. Weinrib, supra note 43, at 449 {citing I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF 
JUSTICE 34 (J. Ladd trans. 1965)). 
46. See Weinrib, supra note 43, at 411-16. Weinrib makes this argument as an amendment to 
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fondant's wrongdoing may risk harm to many persons. Not everyone 
endangered by wrongdoing, however, may demand damages. Causa-
tion singles out a particular plaintiff - one who has been injured by 
the defendant's act - to make a claim on the defendant's resources. 
Without causation, plaintiff's connection to defendant is undifferenti-
ated and vastly overinclusive. 
Wrongdoing is also required. Just as causation identifies why this 
plaintiff is entitled to recover, fault identifies why this defendant is 
obliged to pay. Causation itself is inadequate to this task, for there 
are,. in the nature of things, many causes of any injury. The plaintiff's 
own conduct, for example, is usually, if not always, a but-for cause of 
plaintiff's injury. Other causal antecedents abound, and there is noth-
ing inherent in the concept of causation (as distinct from external limi-
tations imposed in the name of causation) to say which causes count. 
The showing of fault fills this gap. It identifies the causal antecedent 
that will be regarded as legally significant. It singles out a particular 
defendant - one whose wrongful act has caused the plaintiff's injury 
- to make good the plaintiff's loss.47 
More simply, fault supplies the moral dimension to the causal rela-
tionship. While causation traces a physical connection between doer 
and sufferer, it provides in itself no moral basis for coercing compensa-
tion. It supplies no ground for taking this defendant's assets to make 
good the plaintiff's loss. As Weinrib says, "an injury that is not the 
materialization of a wrong is a misfortune devoid of normative signifi-
cance for its author."48 The loss may or may not be shifted on distrib-
utive grounds, but the mere fact of causation is not an intelligible basis 
for wealth transfer without regard to distributive effect. 
In summary, both causation and fault are essential to corrective 
the causation theory of Judith Jarvis Thompson. See Thompson, Remarks on Causation and 
Liability, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101 (1984). 
47. Weinrib summarizes this argument as follows: 
[C]ausation particularizes by singling out this plaintiff from the class of persons whom the 
defendant has endangered. Through injury the general risk which the wrongdoing has un-
reasonably created lodges in a particular person. Similarly, wrongdoing serves to single out 
from among the numerous causal antecedents of the plaintiff's injury the particular cause 
that is juridically significant. Causation particularizes the plaintiff against the background 
of the defendant's wrongful risk creation, and wrongdoing particularizes the defendant 
against the background of the totality of the injury's causes. In this way causation and 
wrongdoing each reciprocally particularize with respect to the other. 
Weinrib, supra note 43, at 429-30. Weinrib's discussion is part of an extended criticism of the 
views of Richard Epstein. Id. at 416-28. For Epstein's views, see Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 
J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liabil-
ity, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 
(1973). 
48. Weinrib, supra note 43, at 430; see also Posner, supra note 42 (criticizing theories of 
corrective justice that dispense with the requirement of wrongdoing as a mischaracterization of 
Aristotle). 
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justice. Together, they make a normatively significant connection be-
tween wrongdoer and victim. The defendant's wrongful act has 
caused the plaintiff's loss; defendant's payment to plaintiff of a sum 
quantifying that loss annuls the wrong done and rectifies the plaintiff's 
injury. Corrective justice thus provides an intelligible basis, apart 
from deterrence, for redressing specific constitutional violations 
through the award of damages. It provides the most persuasive under-
standing of what "compensation," as a value distinct from incentive 
effect, might sensibly mean. 
Ill. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FAULT 
The shift from "compensation" to "corrective justice" focuses at-
tention on the role of fault49 in cases of government unconstitutional-
ity. At one level, this subject is forbiddingly complex, as it 
encompasses the entire range of culpability structures of constitutional 
rights. These requirements are built into the definition of the rights 
themselves, and they vary greatly. Analytically, these requirements 
are unrelated to the remedial structure of section 1983 and Bivens-type 
actions. Those remedies independently require proof of negligence as 
to illegality. This, at least, is a plausible summary of the law of quali-
fied immunity. Disentangling these two strands makes the concept of 
fault in constitutional violations more accessible than it at first 
appears. 
First, there is the culpability structure of the underlying right. 
Although the terminology of the criminal law is rarely used here, 
many constitutional rights are defined in such a way that their viola-
tion requires something analogous to specific intent. An example is 
the guarantee against racial discrimination. A violation of the equal 
protection clause is made out only where there is racially discrimina-
tory motivation. Racially disparate impact is not in itself unconstitu-
tional. 50 Another example comes from the line of cases from Parratt v. 
Taylor 51 through Daniels v. Williams. 52 The Supreme Court ulti-
mately concluded in these cases that the "deprivation" of life, liberty, 
or property prohibited by the due process clause requires an intent to 
deprive. Mere negligence in causing injury to life, liberty, or property 
49. As this discussion makes clear, I am using "fault" and "wrongdoing" in the conventional 
legal sense as culpability, including culpable inadvertence, as in the violation of a legal norm of 
which the actor should have been aware. 
50. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For interesting criticism of this requirement, 
see Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989). 
51. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
52. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
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does not implicate due process concerns. Other examples can be 
found throughout constitutional law, where the motivation underlying 
government action often determines its constitutionality.53 
Other violations of constitutional rights do not require any particu-
lar culpability. A search conducted under an invalid warrant violates 
the fourth amendment, even if all government officials acted reason-
ably and in good faith. 54 Enforcement of an excessively vague crimi-
nal statute is unconstitutional, even if the arresting officers have acted 
entirely in good faith. 55 And a court in deciding what process is due 
for (an intentional) deprivation of property will not be concerned with 
whether the relevant government official might reasonably have 
thought some lesser standard sufficient. 56 In these and in many other 
cases, unconstitutionality may be shown without regard to state of 
mind. 
In short, culpability requirements vary from right to right. They 
derive from the definitions of the rights themselves and are logically 
antecedent to the remedial structure of section 1983. That remedy 
imposes its own culpability requirement through the law of qualified 
immunity. While the defense of qualified immunity very likely applies 
to all official action (except where the immunity is absolute), it is often 
made irrelevant by the culpability structure of the underlying right. 
53. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (requiring that laws challenged as an 
establishment of religion have a secular purpose); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968) (holding constitutional protection for symbolic speech dependent in part on whether the 
governmental interest in regulating such conduct "is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression"). 
54. The fact that the fourth amendment protects against "unreasonable" searches and 
seizures might be taken to suggest that any fourth amendment violation is by definition unreason-
able. Cf. Anderi>on v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 647-68 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). To the 
extent that the fourth amendment guarantee remains an unstructured inquiry into reasonable-
ness, that might be true. See Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Im-
munity in Section 1983 for a Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 61 
(1989). But to the extent that the fourth amendment protection has been cast into prophylactic 
rules - most notably the warrant requirement - that is not the case. As the case law has 
actually developed, it is perfectly possible to be reasonably mistaken about the requirements of 
fourth amendment reasonableness. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) 
(holding a search unconstitutional where law enforcement officers following local precedent 
failed to anticipate the rule ofSteagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), which held that an 
arrest warrant does not justify search of a third party's home where the target of the arrest 
warrant iS reasonably thought to be). 
55. Cf. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974) (one of the cases considered in Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), where the Supreme Court constricted the scope of federal habeas 
review of fourth amendment claims). 
56. This last example confirms that some constitutional rights are mixtures of what a crimi-
nal lawyer would call subjective and objective standards. The establishment clause is another 
example. A law may violate that provision if it has the impermissible purpose of aiding religion 
or if that is its primary effect or if the law leads to excessive government entanglement with 
religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Effect may be a proxy for purpose, but 
entanglement is an independent and wholly objective ground of unconstitutionality. 
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Generally speaking, where the underlying constitutional right requires 
illicit motivation, no further inquiry will be necessary or useful. A 
government officer shown to have acted with racial animus will not be 
heard to say that he or she did not know such action to be unlawful. 
That claim would be legally irrelevant, factually incredible, or both. 57 
Thus, as a practical matter, the state of mind required by a particular 
constitutional right may obviate any concern for the analytically dis-
tinct kind of culpability required by the law of qualified immunity. 
Where the underlying right does not require illicit motivation, at-
tention shifts to the law of qualified immunity. Technically, section 
1983 does not require culpability. That is to say, the cause of action 
for money damages under section 1983 does not require proof of any 
state of mind apart from that which may be required by the definition 
of the underlying right. 58 But state of mind matters nonetheless. It 
comes into play via the defense of qualified immunity. The law of 
qualified immunity varies appreciably with context, but the general 
theme is the defendant's reasonable belief in the legality of the con-
duct. 59 This issue is particularly likely to arise at the margins of con-
stitutional law and where the underlying right does not require illicit 
motivation. In such cases, it may happen that a government officer 
reasonably believes in the lawfulness of action that the courts subse-
quently disapprove. The law of qualified immunity precludes damages 
liability in such cases. 
Obviously, a great deal more can be said about the law of qualified 
57. Most likely it is legally irrelevant because it is factually incredible. This, I think, is much 
of the reason for the evolution of the criminal law doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
In an age where criminality was confined to heinous wrongs, a claim ofnonculpable ignorance of 
the law would be factually incredible and hence legally irrelevant. 
58. For many years this was uncertain, and there was a debate in the literature over whether 
liability under § 1983 could be based on simple negligence. See Gildin, The Standard of Cu/pa· 
bility in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the 
Constitution, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557 (1983) (analyzing the various sources of a fault require· 
ment in civil rights actions); Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: 
The State-of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. CJNN. L. REV. 45 (1977) (reviewing the history of the 
question and suggesting that the standard under § 1983 should vary with the right being as· 
serted). After several false starts, the Supreme Court concluded, as is surely correct, that the 
cause of action created by§ 1983 requires no state of mind additional to that, if any, required by 
the underlying right. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (construing Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), as having decided "that § 1983 contains no independent state-of· 
mind requirement"). 
59. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (holding that police officers sued for uncon· 
stitutional arrest of civil rights demonstrators were entitled to a defense of "good faith and prob-
able cause"); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (holding that the liability of a school 
board member depended in part on whether "he knew or reasonably should have known that the 
action ... would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected"); Anderson v. Creigh-
ton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (holding that a federal agent sued for conducting an unlawful search 
was entitled to summary judgment if the actions alleged were actions "that a reasonable officer 
could have believed ... lawful"). 
.,. 
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immunity. Much of it is controversial, and some of it puzzling.6° For-
tunately, my purpose does not require full explication of this subject; 
still less does it depend on agreement with the particulars of existing 
law. My point is only to indicate by reference the kinds of inquiry that 
the courts have found necessary to determine fault in constitutional 
violations. I do not wish to burden this essay with a lengthy attempt 
to describe the understandings that traditionally have prevailed in this 
field, but I do wish to suggest that some such inquiry is a necessary 
part of the idea of corrective justice as applied to constitutional 
violations. 
Of course, there is another view. One might say, as Owen implies, 
that corrective justice requires restorative transfers for all violations of 
constitutional rights, without regard to fault. 61 One might believe that 
any violation of the Constitution is an act of wrongdoing, that fault is 
inherent in unconstitutionality. On this view, the reasonableness of an 
official's conduct is irrelevant, and every constitutional violation, re-
60. In particular, one might wonder why the idea of fault in constitutional violations (as 
refracted through the law of qualified immunity) requires culpable inadvertence to illegality. By 
contrast, the criminal law is dominated, at least formally, by the maxim that "ignorance of the 
law is no excuse." The difference, I think, lies in the nature of the prohibitions. Where the 
conduct is wrongful in itself (as in traditional crimes and in constitutional violations requiring 
illicit motivation), there will be no concern about culpability with respect to illegality. Where, by 
contrast, the conduct is wrong only because forbidden (as in so-called regulatory offenses and in 
constitutional rights framed prophylactically), fault requires at least culpable inadvertence to the 
terms of the prohibition. For constitutional violations, that proposition is well established by the 
law of qualified immunity. For criminal offenses, there has been a little movement in that direc-
tion, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4(c)(3) (West 1982), but in general the enforcement of 
regulatory offenses continues in uneasy reliance on prosecutorial discretion to weed out cases of 
genuinely reasonable mistake. 
61. This view may be derived from the work of Richard Epstein, see supra note 47, and it has 
been cogently argued to me privately by Epstein and by Michael Wells. I do not wish to under-
take a detailed response to their views based only on my summary of them, but it may be helpful 
to locate one key point of disagreement. In their letters to me, both Epstein and Wells offered 
property hypotheticals to dispute Weinrib's emphasis on fault, either across the board or more 
particularly for government torts. As Epstein said: "[T]o take the easiest case imaginable, sup-
pose that the defendant has by innocent mistake taken the plaintiff's property and kept it on his 
own property. The suit demanding the return of the property is: Give me back my property 
which you took." Epstein concludes that this suit could not be defeated on the ground that the 
defendant lacked fault: "He has what the plaintiff owns, and the theory of redress demands that 
the status quo ante be restored." 
I agree. But it seems to me that a very different case is put where the problem is not misap-
propriation of property, but compensation for personal injury. Where loss has occurred, the 
status quo ante cannot be restored. Someone must bear the loss, and it is very difficult for me to 
think about who that someone should be without bringing in notions of fault. This may be done 
directly, as Weinrib would have it, or through various defenses to strict liability, as (in my under-
standing) Epstein would prefer. No doubt there are important differences in these approaches, 
but I do not think they greatly affect the validity of the analogy I am attempting to draw. At its 
simplest, the dispute may be whether constitutional violations are more akin to takings of prop-
erty rights or to tortious personal injuries. I find the latter more plausible. 
Of course, both Epstein and Wells have a great deal more to say on this subject. I can only 
say that I hope they will have occasion to state publicly the interesting and thoughtful criti<;isms 
which they have generously shared with me. 
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gardless of circumstance, is presumptively appropriate for rectification 
by money damages. 
I cannot prove this intuition error, but I can say a few words about 
why I am inclined to think it so. First, it is important to keep in mind 
that the kind of fault identified by the law of qualified immunity does 
not define the intrinsic content of constitutional rights, nor does it 
limit the usual mechanisms of their enforcement. The negligence-type 
inquiry derives not from the law of constitutional rights, but from the 
law of constitutional torts - that is, from the use of compensatory 
damages to vindicate constitutional violations. This remedy is a mod-
ern addition to the constitutional scheme. As originally conceived, 
most constitutional rights were not standards of compensatory liabil-
ity. They were prohibitions of government misconduct and could be 
invoked defensively to resist government power. The creation of pri-
vate causes of action for compensatory damages added a new and im-
portant mechanism of enforcement to the existing constitutional 
scheme. That this additional remedy should have its own structure 
and limitations is hardly surprising. Recognizing the negligence-type 
inquiry as central to the law of constitutional torts does not imply a 
redefinition of the rights themselves nor any limitation of their tradi-
tional application. 
Second, the belief that fault of the sort ordinarily relevant in com-
pensatory judgments is intrinsic in all constitutional violations seems 
to me more responsive to the traditional rhetoric of constitutional law 
than to much of its current doctrine. Traditionally, constitutional 
rights are described as fundamental and timeless. In fact, some are 
neither. The Supreme Court recognizes this most pointedly in the 
doctrine of nonretroactivity. These cases involve constitutional rights 
that are admittedly new and the absence of which is sufficiently tolera-
ble that the rulings are made to apply only prospectively. 62 Similar 
characteristics are found in many constitutional decisions that are not 
singled out for nonretroactivity. Owen itself is a good example. The 
municipality's error in that case was the failure to provide a lawfully 
62. See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973) (refusing retroactive application oflimi-
tations on increased sentences after appeal announced in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 
(1969)); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (refusing retroactive application of the 
ruling fa Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), that electronic interception is a search); 
Destefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (refusing retroactive application of Bloom v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 194 (1968), extending the right to trial by jury); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) 
(refusing retroactive application of the requirement of counsel at pre-trial line-ups announced in 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 
(1966) (refusing retroactive application of the rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), 
forbidding prosecutorial comment on a defendant's failure to testify); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
U.S. 618 (1965) (refusing retroactive application of the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961)). 
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discharged police chief with a "name-clearing hearing" - that is, a 
governmentally sponsored, nondecisional opportunity for the police 
chief to rebut certain accusations damaging to his reputation. Such 
proceedings had not been required at the time the police chief was 
fired. 63 In these circumstances, it is surely odd to describe the munici-
pality's action as intrinsically wrongful. In this and other cases, 64 the 
only apparent fault is a failure of prescience. 
It is precisely in such circumstances that the role of fault must be 
judged. The importance of a negligence-type inquiry is not revealed in 
the cases where it would be readily satisfied. Rather, one must look at 
situations where a requirement of fault would be decisive. If, as I be-
lieve to be true, there are cases in which unconstitutional actions can-
not be considered blameworthy, then it follows that fault is not 
inherent in all violations of constitutional rights. In some cases, an 
independent inquiry into the unreasonableness of the government's 
conduct will be required in order to find wrongdoing. Absent such a 
finding, there is no wrong to right, and the rationale of corrective jus-
tice does not apply. Whatever instrumental arguments might be made 
for strict liability (arguments not considered here), there is, in my 
opinion, no noninstrumental basis for compensatory liability without 
proof of fault. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The centrality of fault to the idea of corrective justice has impor-
tant implications for the law of section 1983. "Implications" is used 
advisedly, for even if these views are correct, they do not lead inexora-
bly to specific conclusions. For one thing, there has been no discus-
sion of incentive effects. Such concerns are surely relevant and 
perhaps controlling. No analysis that avoids them can possibly be 
complete. But that incompleteness does not negate the value of clari-
fying our understanding of the nondeterrence perspective. It is not 
necessary to solve all of a problem in order to say something useful 
about a part. 65 The question here is what sort of noninstrumental con-
63. See Perry v. Sinderrnan, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972). 
64. Cf Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), where the constitutional viola-
tion consisted of an action correctly described by Justice White as "not then illegal under federal, 
state, or local law." 475 U.S. at 485 (White, J., concurring). The action was recognized as 
unconstitutional only after the subsequent decision of Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 
(1981). 
65. For a related inquiry into another part of the problem of damages actions for constitu-
tional violations, see Jeffries, Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to 
Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REV. 1461 (1989). 
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cerns should intrude on the analysis of incentive effect. In those 
terms, the focus on corrective justice has both specific and general im-
plications for the law of section 1983. 
The specific implication is that Owen is wrong - at least on its 
stated rationale. The Court's desire to avoid "injustice" (which I take 
to be a noninstrumental concern) does not support the abrogation of 
qualified immunity. "Elemental notions of fairness" in fact do not 
"dictate that one who causes a loss should bear the loss." If that were 
true, compensation would be required for an enormous range of non-
actionable losses caused by government. The notion that government 
should compensate citizens for the "costs" of living in an organized 
society is a breathtaking departure from existing social arrangements 
and one not indicated by any accepted understanding of "fairness" or 
"justice." 
The "elemental notion of fairness" to which the Court should have 
made reference is Aristotelian corrective justice: one who wrongfully 
causes a loss should make good that loss. This idea is descriptively 
familiar and morally persuasive, but it does not support a universal 
desideratum of "compensation" for all losses caused by unconstitu-
tional actions. It supports wealth transfers without regard to distribu-
tive effect only where there is fault. Therefore, unless deterrence 
concerns dictate otherwise (an issue not considered here), the Owen 
Court's withdrawal of qualified immunity from local governments 
seems misguided. 
The same point can be made more generally. Outside the context 
of Owen, the Court has often noted the "injustice, particularly in the 
absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is re-
quired, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discre-
tion. "66 This emphasis on fault is entirely consistent with the 
argument from corrective justice. It rightly identifies the defendant's 
state of mind, not as some extraneous intrusion into the workings of a 
compensatory regime, but as an essential feature of the normative ba-
sis for imposing liability in the first place. Occasionally, however, the 
vagrant attitude of Owen slips in. Occasionally, official immunity is 
treated as if it were subversive of the appropriate reach of a compensa-
tory regime. 67 Thus, immunity claims sometimes evoke a hostility 
born of the suspicion that any limitation on damages liability for un-
66. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 
(1978). 
67. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 647-48 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Wells, The Past and Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common 
Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 78-81 (1986). 
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constitutional acts is in principle undesirable. This intuition is error. 
Investigation into the defendant's fault is entirely appropriate. At 
least in the absence of an argument based on incentive effects, the in-
quiry into fault is essential to the case for awarding money damages 
for constitutional violations. Properly understood, the value of "com-
pensation" is not to the contrary. 
